The blinkered Fed

  • In a narrow technical sense, the FOMC was indeed hawkish
  • But in the cessation of QT and through questions, it more broadly reconfirmed a reaction function at once deeply asymmetric and completely oblivious to asset price inflation
  • This paves the way for a further melt-up in risk assets and havens – and for more assets to exhibit the sort of exponential sawtooth boom-bust recently seen in gold

The long-bond problem

  • The recent “bond rout” would be better described as a long-end bond technical
  • It reflects dwindling pension demand more than existential fears around inflation or debt sustainability
  • Governments should reduce their long-end issuance accordingly
  • Investors should continue to hold steepeners until they do – without necessarily being short duration

Trading a decaying hegemon

  • The more Trump exerts personal control over US organs of state, the more the US’ real power is eroded
  • The main mystery is why this is still not being priced into markets
  • Part of the answer revolves around the amorality of capitalism, and prospects for more easy money
  • But much is attributable to the extreme and abrupt nature of credit repricings

When does liquidity turn to fumes?

  • Commentators argue increasingly that tariffs matter little, and for the return of US and tech exceptionalism
  • But this risks retro-fitting the explanation to the price action
  • An examination of the monetary data points to the exceptional way in which fiscal stimulus has been fuelling equities

More on Section 899

  • Like tariffs, Section 899 continues the Trump administration’s declaration of economic war against erstwhile allies
  • As with tariffs, there remain considerable questions about the scale and scope of its eventual application
  • But the net effect should still be to cause foreign investors of all types to question their investments in America

Shorting spendthrift sovereigns

  • Even before Trump’s EU tariff tweets, the risk rally had seemed unconvincing
  • This is in part because bond market developments are so concerning
  • But we think there are better ways to position than outright shorts in 30y govies

Gradually, then suddenly

  • The bounceback in risk is unconvincing
  • This is in part because of overoptimism that tariffs and economic pain can be avoided
  • It is also because sentiment across markets has moved much more than actual positions
  • But ultimately it is because Hemingway’s famous quip applies as much to reserve currencies as to personal bankruptcy

Three thoughts on tariffs

  • The announced headline tariff rates are all over the place
  • But tariffs in general are more punitive than consensus expected, even after the inclusion of VAT
  • The immediate market response is being clouded by liquidity factors

T-Day landings and liquidity

  • Despite all the attention to tariffs, short-term market moves remain surprisingly well correlated with CB liquidity
  • Liquidity dynamics have the potential to amplify any T-Day relief rally
  • But we would still fade any such move thereafter

Deficits, debt, and dollar devaluation

  • It is remarkable that proposals for a Mar-a-Lago accord have not yet sparked an even greater flight out of US dollars, debt, and risk
  • That they have not yet done so is thanks to a mix of incredulity, inertia, and temporary liquidity factors
  • Current account deficits, though a source of vulnerability, are in many respects a measure of attractiveness to foreign capital
  • What’s damaging is when – as in the US – they are allowed to turn into ever-escalating debt
  • What the Mar-a-Lago proposals’ discussion of sticks and carrots lacks is a proper notion of trust – and of the scale and suddennness of the consequences once it has been lost
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