It is remarkable that proposals for a Mar-a-Lago accord have not yet sparked an even greater flight out of US dollars, debt, and risk
That they have not yet done so is thanks to a mix of incredulity, inertia, and temporary liquidity factors
Current account deficits, though a source of vulnerability, are in many respects a measure of attractiveness to foreign capital
What’s damaging is when – as in the US – they are allowed to turn into ever-escalating debt
What the Mar-a-Lago proposals’ discussion of sticks and carrots lacks is a proper notion of trust – and of the scale and suddennness of the consequences once it has been lost
Markets’ response to the evident risks has thus far consisted primarily of risk rotation
This seems increasingly likely to evolve into full-fledged risk reduction
That it has not done so to date is thanks not only to dwindling hopes that Trump is bluffing, but also (yet again) to support from central bank liquidity
It is tempting to look at the performance of US equities in 2H24 and conclude that central bank liquidity no longer matters for markets
But a closer examination of both other markets and shorter timescales suggests this would be a mistake
It instead highlights the predominant role currently being played by fund flows and US exceptionalism
While it is possible to paint scenarios where liquidity contributes to a melt-up in risk in early 2025, on balance we see it as one of a number of reasons to be skeptical of the bullish consensus