The limits of easy money

When money drives markets more than fundamentals

Matt King


Global Markets Strategist

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
Markets seem to have found a new source of fuel



Source: MSCI, Bloomberg, FRB Dallas, Satori Insights.

Rising defaults yet spreads at tights





Source: US Federal Courts, Bloomberg, Satori Insights.

It looks more like easy money than fundamentals



Agenda

From credit cycle to debt supercycle

What liquidity means for credit


The limits of leveraging



What happened to fundamentally-driven cycles?

No longer clear what time it is


The corporate leverage cycle / clock



Source: Satori Insights.

There used to be a clearly defined cycle

Net issuance, rolling 4Q, US nonfin, % GDP



Source: Federal Reserve, Macrobond, Satori Insights.


Today's cycles are longer — and less driven by corporates




What ended the last few cycles was a downturn in asset prices


Recent cycles ended by asset price falls

US peak real rates by cycle vs debt



The only way is up





Source: S&P, Macrobond, Morningstar, Bloomberg, Satori Insights.


Now they only ever seem to go up



Fundamentals no longer seem to matter much


Until 2012, equities followed earnings

Global net earnings revisions (4wk mov avg) vs equities



Spreads & vol used to track uncertainty

News-based uncertainty vs credit spreads, 3m mov avg




Source: Economic Policy Uncertainty, Bloomberg, Satori Insights.

Many valuation metrics broke down around 2012



Another change occurred at the same time




Markets seemed to start driving fundamentals rather than just anticipating them

Real yields are only a partial explanation


Real yields: once explanatory, now not


US 2y TIPS 3m chg vs MSCI World 3m chg



Source: Macrobond, Fed, Satori Insights.

Risk stayed on when yields went up!





Source: S&P Global, Fed, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Satori Insights.


Low real yields drove money into risk — but when real yields went up it never came out



The real driver was always credit creation & money flow


Asset prices follow debt more than GDP

US real estate+equity mkt cap vs debt & profits, % GDP



Borrowing now driven by public sector

US borrowing by sector, 3y mov avg, % GDP



Source: Fed, Macrobond, Satori Insights.


But post-GFC changes in credit creation have been dominated by the public sector



This explains why rates now seem to do so little


Reserves swings are remarkable

US monthly loan growth vs reserves chg, \$bn



Central banks crowded investors in/out

CB reserves chg (\$tn) vs \$ HY spreads, rolling 12m



Source: national central banks, Macrobond, Satori Insights.


Rates are no longer driving swings in aggregate credit growth



Since 2024, the fuel source is no longer central bank balance sheets

Even with -ve sentiment


US equity fund+ETF inflows vs sentiment



Source: AAII, ICI, Satori Insights.
Uses ETF inflows only from 2019 as ICI data exclude CITs.

An invisible hand pushes up


HF VIP index return-S&P, %, vs CB res



Source: national central banks, GS, Bloomberg, Satori Insights.

Inflows keep powering ahead

CB res vs mut fund+ETF flow, rolling 6m



Source: national central banks, ICI, Macrobond, Satori Insights.

It feels like more easy money.

But where's it coming from —
and just how powerful and durable is it?



Agenda

From credit cycle to debt supercycle

What liquidity means for credit


The limits of leveraging



What's remarkable is how little demand to borrow there is


Demand to borrow surprisingly weak

Fed loan survey, large & medium corp



IT not financed by conventional credit

US private investment by type, % GDP



Source: BIS, BEA, USCB, Macrobond, Satori Insights.


It has nothing to do with banks' supposed reluctance to lend



Look at which companies are borrowing, and what for


More for refinancing than investment

Reasons for € corp loan demand, % reporting increase



When financial activity dominates real

€ lev loan issuance by use of proceeds, €bn



Source: PitchBook LCD, Satori Insights.


Borrowing driven more by financial activity than real



This has led to a pronounced imbalance in credit markets


What at first appears plenty of assets...

Global corporate credit outstanding, \$tn



...has in fact been outpaced by demand

US corp bond+loan outstandings, % GDP



Source: BEA, Fed, UNCTAD, Macrobond, Satori Insights.






You can only lend to those who wish to borrow


US loan growth is to the financial sector

New loans by sector, rolling 12m, % GDP



M&A is dominated by them too

Global M&A transactions (rolling 12m, \$tn) vs equities



Source: Bloomberg, Satori Insights.


Increasingly, that means private equity



This changes the rules for debt investors

Traditional protections under threat


Covenant-lite share of new-issued loans, %



Source: ACC, Covenant Review, Kirkland & Ellis, BIS, Satori Insights.
*Unweighted average skewed by small loans. Covlite proportion for >\$1bn loans closer to 70%.

PE⇒ ratings drift distinctly worse in HY

Net ratings upgrades / all ratings changes, Europe



Source: Moody's, S&P, Bloomberg, Satori Insights. US pattern similar.

See also "S&P: Defaults of sponsor-backed companies grew in 2024", Private Debt Investor, Jan25.






Surely this isn't all bad news?


Reduced covenants = reduced defaults

US lev loan default rates, rolling 1y, %



2nd lien carries premium for LME risk

US leveraged loan index spreads by seniority, bp



Source: Bloomberg, BoA, Satori Insights.


Reduced covenants + constant refi + LMEs have boosted returns and suppressed defaults



If private equity is becoming Hotel California...

Holding periods increasing


Median global buyout holding period, years



Source: Bain, PitchBook, Pregin, Privateequityinfo.com, Satori

Exits decreasing


Global PE buyout statistics, \$bn



Source: Bain *Private Equity Outlook 2025*, Satori Insights.
See also "Exits favor the deleveraged" in *Troubling Signals for Private-Equity Exits*, A. Zaid, MSCI.

Thank Zeus for private credit

PE exits taking form of Continuation Vehicles, %



Source: Jefferies, Bloomberg, Satori Insights.


...private credit are the staff whose continued attendance keeps the hotel running



The question is whether risks are being stored up in the system


Sometimes even First shall be last

First Brands 1st Lien guaranteed senior secured loan price



And spreads lack any sort of premium

Net upgrades / all ratings changes, W Europe, vs spreads




Source: Moody's, S&P, Bloomberg, Satori Insights. US pattern similar.

When defaults do occur, recoveries are frequently minimal

The impact of excess demand

How credit responds to too much money


Index pricing schematic



Source: Satori Insights, Hans Lorenzen.

You can see this effect in practice

\$ HY index members ranked by rating and price, Oct25



Source: Bloomberg, Satori Insights.

Liquidity steepens the credit cliff



Agenda

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
The limits of leveraging




Anything leveraged has outperformed

The more levered, the better?

Source: Morningstar, Bloomberg, Cliffwater, Macrobond, Satori Insights.



Parts of credit still harbour doubts




At what point does leveraging reach limits?



Leveraging is the financial equivalent of magic

Who needs banks?

How leveraging through promises today juices paper wealth at the expense of liabilities tomorrow



Source: Satori Insights. For some more precise numbers as to why the hyperscaler capex boom may be overdone, see Global Crossing Is Reborn, Praetorian Capital, Aug 25. Also OpenAI, Nvidia Deals Spark Fear AI Is Being Propped Up, Bloomberg, 10 Oct.


Wealth is created ex nihilo – provided the magicians borrowers and lenders remain credible



So where's the new money coming from, and how durable is it?


Private non-fin borrowing unchanged

US borrowing by sector, rolling annual, % GDP



Impulse now from fiscal, Fed & fins

Annual chg in 3y US borrowing by sector, % GDP



Source: Fed, Macrobond, Satori Insights.


In outright terms, from fiscal; in terms of the recent surge, from the financial sector



Can we track short-term moves more directly? (1)


Money utilization≈depo+MMkt+funds

Uses of US money vs total creation, rolling 3m, \$tn



Money creation≈reserves+fiscal+loans

Sources of US money and asset creation, rolling 3m, \$tn




Source: Federal Reserve, Satori Insights.

Unprecedented fund inflows have their roots in fiscal money creation




Can we track short-term moves more directly? (2)



Much is ending up at hedge funds

Hedge fund borrowing by type vs MMF repo activity, \$tn




Source: The Office of Financial Research (OFR), Fed, Macrobond, Satori Insights.


Financial sector leveraging is feeding repo & hedge funds




HF leverage can potentially diversify and stabilize markets



Long and getting longer






Source: The Office of Financial Research (OFR), Fed, Macrobond, Satori Insights.

At present it's fuelling net longs





Equity

In a sense, the leveraging just creates asset price sensitivity



Momentum chasing






Source: MSCI, Macrobond, Satori Insights.

The real problem is how people have learnt to deploy it



So can we just lever ourselves to prosperity?



No. But the trick works while prices keep rising



So where are the true limits?

What are we borrowing for?

Three reasons for borrowing

Real economy



Consumption & capex

Repay from future income

"Hedge"

Minsky's three finance types

How will we service it?

Can pay interest and principal

Risky assets



Capital gain

Repay from price gain

"Speculative"

Can pay interest; must roll principal

Safe assets (FX, gold)



Capital flight

Repay from debasement

"Ponzi"

Requires capital gain or asset sale to pay interest and principal

Source: The Financial Instability Hypothesis, H. Minsky, 1992, Satori Insights.

Watch both the pace of borrowing, and where the money then goes



Dalio's four warning signs from history


Indicator Why it matters Harder to escape High debt problems by borrowing Society has High inequality different incentives Society pulls in different directions High political and starts fighting polarization internally Decline of old War becomes more likely great power

Source: Satori Insights, with inspiration from <u>The Changing World Order</u>, R. Dalio. See also <u>Trading a decaying hegemon</u>, M. King, 21 Aug.

Where we stand

Record debt, near-record inequality


US debt (% GDP) and wealth (income share) levels



Source: BIS, Federal Reserve, WID, Jorda-Shularick-Taylor Macrohistory, Satori Insights.

Less common ground now than during US Civil War

Ideology split in US Congress since 1800, index



Source: voteview.com.

See also Philly Fed Partisan Conflict Index (recently somewhat ironically discontinued).

The scary thing isn't the economics; it's political choices which make the economics worse



How to monitor progress?

Watch bonds


Global 30y government bond yields, %



Source: Macrobond, Bloomberg, Satori Insights.
Technical factors are at work here too. See *The long-bond problem*, 8 Sep.

Watch FX


Exchange rates for gold and CHF, \$



Source: Macrobond, Satori Insights.

Watch capital flight

Foreign UST at Fed (\$tn) vs term premia




Source: Federal Reserve, NY Fed, Macrobond, Satori Insights. For daily updates and more examples, see our <u>UST-USD capital flight</u> <u>charts</u>.

Keep watching the exits, and remember runs are contagious




Conclusion


We keep forcing money in



Problems postponed are problems accumulated



Credibility is everything




t=1

Ponzi schemes work – until people stop believing in them



Appendix: how large has the financial sector become?



Slicing and dicing risks double-counting – but maybe that's the point

